CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

APPROACH OF WAR,

AND THE

CONDUCT

OF

HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTERS;

TO WHICH IS ADDED

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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

APPROACH OF WAR.

THE debates in Parliament on the ſubject of Mr. Pitt's intended war with Ruſſia and her allies, contain a body of information which, for its urgent importance, ought to be made, in ſome ſhape or other, to reach the ſenſe and feelings of every Engliſhman. But there is ſo much more of it than the common maſs of our fellow citizens can comprehend and combine at once, (and it is the common maſs who pay the expence of war with their daily bread) that a ſelection of the principal matters, ſtated in plain words, and thoſe words as few as poſſible, appears more likely to anſwer that purpoſe, than any circumſtantial detail of the arguments on either ſide.

Let me previouſly diſclaim, however, in the name of every one who has heard of this diſaſtrous meaſure, (except perhaps the Miniſter's immediate dependants) all approbation, ſupport, or participation of what kind ſoever in its origin. Be it known to thoſe whom the mere general rumour of its approach has but juſt reached, that we, in this metropolis, moſt decidedly reprobate the counſels to which it is owing, deteſt the principles on which it is maintained, and diſtruſt the capacity of thoſe who are to conduct it: that Parliament itſelf heſitates; while indignation and alarm fill every breaſt, without regard to connections or parties, or any other perſonal motive. Taxed to the uttermoſt farthing, we find a raſh, inexperienced Miniſter about

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toplunge us into awar with a power long thefriend of this country, who has made no attack upon our territories or commerce, offered no inſult to our honour, nor ſhown the ſlighteſt diſpoſition to ſuch conduct; who has done, moreover, nothing that can be conſtrued into an injury or offence to any one of our allies in any ſhape, form, mode, or under any conſtruction, or the perverſion of any whatſoever.

As to the *cauſe* of this war, (*reaſon* there is none) Miniſters ſeem determined to involve it in profound darkneſs, and all the low myſtery of ſtate intrigues. Led like beaſts to the ſlaughter, the people are inſolently told, WAR OR PEACE IS THE KING'S PREROGATIVE. This is plain language: and we, to whom it is addreſſed, are not likely to invelope ours in much circumlocution. Force us, by dint of oppreſſion and diſtreſs, to inquire into the ſource of that prerogative, and we may be tempted to reſume it. But what does that Miniſter deſerve whoſe abuſe of his power is ſuch, as to make us entertain a doubt of the excellence of our Conſtitution? A life and reputation ſuch as his, will poorly atone for the miſchief.

Except on this ABSOLUTE WILL of the Miniſter, we know not where to fix. It is an acknowledged fact, that there exiſts no Treaty between Great Britain and other powers by which the public faith is pledged to our interference in the war between Ruſſia and the Porte. Had the defenſive Treaties with Pruſſia and Holland borne ſuch a conſtruction, we ſhould have kept our faith by furniſhing our contingent. Even this were to be lamented; but to this there is ſome end. Great Britain would, in that caſe openly have appeared as auxiliary. The projected war, however, has no claim to that character. In fact, it has no character at all, but that of being a war of vanity. A peace of vanity has once been heard of: the miſtreſs of Lewis XV. anxious for the renewal of that monarch's attentions, gave peace to Europe at Aix-la-Chapelle. But the modern French diſlike the ſyſtem on which theſe things were done; juſtly imagining that the vanity which gave peace one day, might involve them in hoſtilities the next. They have ſent it, therefore, to England, for the uſe of a Heaven-born miniſter, whoſe firſt trial of its principle is by a war, more wanton and more wicked than the page of

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hiſtory records ſince the civilization of mankind, and the connection of ſtates with each other.

He tells us as much himſelf. A ſingular diſtinction between his *treaties* and his *ſyſtem* unravels the whole myſtery.

His treaties, under this diſtinction, are ſuppoſed to contain a ſet of ſtipulations to be interpreted not by the plain, obvious import of the terms in which they are drawn; but by a reſerved, ſecret, unexplained ſyſtem, concealed within the breaſts of two or three ambitious projectors, whoſe arbitrary diſcretion is the only rule of their conduct.

We are too deeply intereſted in this queſtion to paſs it by without a few obſervations.

It is the right of Parliament to call for all treaties. The King's Miniſter adviſing his Majeſty to ſuch and ſuch alliances, when he lays them before Parliament and aſks its approbation, obviates the exerciſe of that right by meeting its wiſhes. So acted Mr. Pitt in the caſe before us. The Dutch treaty, the Pruſſian treaty, the ſubſidary treaty with the Landgrave of Heſſe, were all produced to Parliament; and the motives for entering into them explained to be the eſtabliſhment of *a pacific defenſive ſyſtem*. They were ſaid to be equal to that object; and confidence largely called for was as largely given.

What did Mr. Pitt by this, but pledge his character and reſponſibility, that under this pacific defenſive ſyſtem, eſtabliſhed not upon one treaty merely, but reſulting from an aggregate of treaties, the country was ſafe, and might repoſe in peace? If, therefore, while he held forth theſe proſpects in his declarations to Parliament explanatory of the nature of his three treaties, he was ſecretly carrying on a ſeries of intrigues, remonſtrances, and repreſentations at foreign courts, totally oppoſite to the nature of thoſe treaties, and wholly incompatible with them, and which he now calls *a ſyſtem of peace*, in contradiction to the *pacific ſyſtem* he laid before Parliament—I aſk, whether ſuch conduct be fairly deſcribed by the terms, mockery, deluſion, or inſult; or whether it be any thing leſs than a direct fraud upon the King, upon Parliament, and upon the People?

Such, however, is the naked fact. He tells us, that to preſerve his *pacific ſyſtem*, we muſt go to war with Ruſſia

and

and her Allies, although no article in the treaties forming that ſyſtem has received the leaſt contravention by thoſe powers. When he comes to juſtify the war, the firſt thing he does is to renounce and completely abandon the whole of his *pacific ſyſtem;* while he brings forward, for the firſt time, and dictatorially demands that Parliament ſhall tranſfer its confidence to it—another ſyſtem dark, ſecret, and unavowed; confuſed in its object, fraudulent in its creation, unknown and inexplicable to any being upon earth but himſelf and his Pruſſian confederate. As to the Dutch one, he has been wholly kept out of the ſecret from the beginning.

Now however, that we are advanced thus far in the diſcovery, let us ſee to what this ſyſtem leads.

A war with Ruſſia, ſays the Miniſter, is neceſſary for the preſervation of the balance of power in Europe.

The period at which this phraſe of *balance of power* poſſeſſed any determinate meaning, was when the mighty monarchy of France, concentred in her ſtrength, and inſolent in her proſperity, menaced not the liberties of Europe only, but the conſtitution eſtabliſhed in this iſland at the Revolution, and the ſettlement of the crown in his Majeſty's illuſtrious family. It was then that King William began, and his ſucceſſors completed a ſyſtem of defenſive alliances, by which the confederating powers guaranteed mutually to each other the integrity of their reſpective dominions. Theſe objects were clear, intelligible, and grounded upon the moſt imminent neceſſity.

While France continued formidable, (and never was ſhe more ſo than at the cloſe of the American war) it was not wiſe to abandon this ſyſtem. Change of circumſtances might demand a change of the members compoſing ſuch a confederacy, but never could juſtify its abandonment. It is notorious to Europe, however, that Mr. Pitt did wholly neglect, and that his companions were ſuffered to ridicule "the romantic ſyſtem," as they called it in declamatory ſpeeches*; and that he never beſtowed a thought upon the balance of power until France, the object of it, by deſerting her friends in Holland, and by the operation of her internal diſtractions, avowed her total incapacity to diſturb the peace of mankind any longer. Our profound Miniſter then began ſeriouſly

* Mr. Wilberforce.

to think of a balance of power; and plunged himſelf over head and ears in all the traſh and rubbiſh of German politics.

As yet, however, this *balance of power* did not ſeem to have any diſtinct object in the minds either of Mr. Pitt or his confederates. It proceeded at firſt upon a general and complex plan of fomenting quarrels between all ſorts of nations, of keeping alive animoſities, and ſtirring up rebellions to the legitimate ſovereignty of every ſtate that came within the compaſs of their influence. Theſe they put in motion by a ſet of meddling, miſchief-making intrigues, hatched, as it ſhould rather ſeem, in the office of ſome plodding inſtrument of "village vexation," than digeſted by wiſe Stateſmen in the cabinets of great Kings Unlike, indeed, to that bold Congreſs of Princes who planned under the auſpices of our immortal deliverer at the Hague, the ſyſtem and the military meaſures that baffled the victorious arms of Louis, and ſecured the liberty of nations!

But an object could not long be wanting, where the ſource of litigation was ſo little likely to fail. His Pruſſian Majeſty wanting a few towns in Poland, (which it ſeems his predeceſſor was either aſhamed to aſk, or had forgot to take) found himſelf oppoſed, as well he might be, by the influence of the Court of Peterſburg. The Confederates agreed, therefore, to *humble the Ruſſian power*.

In purſuance of this plan, they began by exciting the Ottoman Porte to a direct breach of the Peace of Kainardgi; a peace to the eſtabliſhment of which, on honourable and advantageous terms to Ruſſia, Great Britain had principally contributed. I ſtate not this fact upon vague rumour; it was put very ſtrongly by Mr. Fox to the Miniſter, who did not deny it, in the debate on the King's Meſſage. It is loudly proclaimed in every European Court; with the addition, that Great Britain was the chief agent in this project of aggreſſion. The next ſtep was to engage Sweden in the conteſt. Three years of continued ill fortune to the Turkiſh arms diſtinguiſh this war, during which the Britiſh Miniſter, who now talks to us ſo emphatically of the danger to the Balance of Europe, never once interfered to aſſiſt either of thoſe whom he had ſtimulated to begin it, in hopes, no doubt, that all three of them, Sweden, Turkey, as well

as Ruſſia, would, in their turns, be ſo completely beaten, as to leave them at laſt entirely at the mercy of the Confederates. I bluſh at the diſingenuous part Britain is compelled to act under this hateful ſyſtem, inſtead of recurring to that open, manly ſtyle of remonſtrance in which ſhe has been uſed to ſtate her grievances, and to enforce the redreſs of them.

The meaning of a Balance of Power, however, now appears to reſolve itſelf into this ſingle point, viz. That RUSSIA SHALL NOT KEEP POSSESSION OF OCZAKOW AND ITS DISTRICT. For after all their parade, the fact is, that *Ruſſia has long ago conſented to the ſurrender of all ſhe has taken from the Turks, except the fortreſs of Oczakow.* A plain, uninformed man would naturally aſk, What are the revenues, what the commerce, what the ſtrength, population, or extent of the dependencies of this Oczakow? whether it were equal to Sileſia before the Houſe of Branburgh, anxious to preſerve the Balance of Power, uſurped it? or whether, like the Britiſh Gibraltar, ſome point of honour annexed a value to its barren rock? Nothing of all this would he find to be true, or that Oczakow was any thing but a pile of ruins, uſeleſs to Ruſſia but for the protection of her commerce on the Nieper; uſeleſs to the Porte except for the purpoſe of moleſting that commerce.

But if the Balance be deſtroyed by Ruſſia's *retaining* Oczakow, what became of it when Oczakow was *taken?* This great, imperious neceſſity, to which all juſtice muſt ſubmit, was then as preſſing at leaſt as at the preſent hour. Inſtead of ſuggeſting to us, however, the remoteſt apprehenſion of our being likely, at any time, to engage in war, no leſs than five ſpeeches from the Throne have been produced ſince the capture of this fortreſs*, in not one of which is there the leaſt mention of the probability of ſuch an event. Very humane regret is expreſſed by his Majeſty that the war ſhould continue between Ruſſia and the Porte, but ſo far from any terror of its ultimately reaching this happy iſland, not a little credit is taken for keeping us out of it.

Of the contrary perſuaſion, in the minds of the King's Miniſters, we have ſome memorable evidence: On the 19th of April, 1790, Mr. Pitt opened a budget, in which he argued much upon the flouriſhing ſtate of the revenue; much upon the new ſources of commerce and wealth which had

* Oczakow was taken in December 1788.

been diſcovered; much upon *the continuance of Peace, which he ſaw nothing in the aſpect of politics that could diſturb.* Long previous to this, ſo far back, I believe, as the 10th of February, he knew that a groſs and outrageous inſult had been offered to the Britiſh flag by a Spaniſh officer at Nootka Sound. Accuſed of duplicity in having held out ſo deciſively the proſpect of Peace, when he had known this fact ſo long—what was his defence? That *the complaint* had been communicated to him at that time, but *not the particulars of aggravation*:—adding a convenient "*If*" to qualify the aſſurances of his ſpeech. Parliament received the excuſe; for it was the age of confidence; a plant of rapid growth in ſanguine boſoms! But *now* what becomes of it? At this very time Oczakow was in the poſſeſſion of Ruſſia; and the great Laudhon, at the head of the Imperial armies, had reſtored the fortune of Auſtria on the Danube, and was concerting his operations with the Ruſſian General. If ever the Balance of Power could be affected by the ſucceſſes of the Ruſſian arms, and the hoſtile interference of this country be juſtified, that ſurely was the moment. Mr. Pitt thought not ſo, nor had one idea upon the ſubject entered his mind: unleſs the miraculous *if*, preſerving its virtue to the laſt, ſhall be preſſed into the ſervice here to ſave the wretched remnant of his conſiſtency.

But this, ſays Mr. Pitt, is not the queſtion; "My having been wrong then, is no argument againſt my being right now. The balance *is* in danger, and Great Britain muſt go to war to preſerve its equipoiſe."

The ſyſtem breaks upon us now in its full deformity. Here it is revealed that we are bound by the balance of power to AN IMPLIED GUARANTY of the whole Turkiſh Empire, which it becomes our duty to watch over and preſerve in its unity, undivided and indiviſible. It follows by analogy to the limits of other States, that every change in this unſteady balance, varying often according to natural cauſes, will demand a war to ſettle it. Hence it will appear, (and I am ſure with more reaſon) that if the preſent troubles in France ſhould end in re-uniting Alſace to the Auſtrian poſſeſſions, Pruſſia muſt receive a proportionate augmentation of territory, in order to compenſate for the addition of that rich province to the dominions of his

natural

natural enemy, and that England muſt riſk a war to obtain it for him.

If ſuch be the principle avowed, inſtead of *confidence*—the time is come for a general union among mankind, to extirpate this atrocious ſyſtem of carnage and devaſtation, and make a laſting example of its authors: for it goes to the extent not only of a reciprocal guaranty among the contracting parties of the integrity of their reſpective poſſeſſions, but forcibly to keep thoſe of every individual ſtate *exactly in their preſent condition*, without regard to the benefit of thoſe who live in them A more monſtrous principle was never heard of. It goes, in the caſe before us, to ſtop the progreſs of all civilization and improvement, to continue ſome of the fineſt countries in the world under the barbarous dominion of ignorance, ſuperſtition, and that worſt of all tyrannies, the ſyſtematic ſervitude of the mind as well as the body to the influence of fanaticiſm. Such, however, are the principles in defence of which Engliſhmen are to leave their homes, and riſk the laſt of their reſources in a war with a nation that never injured them! Who, after this, ſhall anſwer for the duration of peace a month together? The limits of mighty Empires muſt vary in the neceſſity of things. Their ſtrength too increaſes in other ways beſides the extenſion of thoſe limits. The aſpiring, energetic principle of commerce acknowledges no balance of power; no theories of ambitious monarchs, who, to ſecure their own petty intereſts, would keep whole countries depopulate, and check the fertility of indulgent Nature herſelf. Where is the preſumptuous arrogance that ſhall bind Providence to its ſyſtems, and forbid the ſoil to ſhare its riches with induſtrious man? As well might we ſtipulate that Siberia ſhall not riſe from her deſerts, or ſettle the population of Tartary at the Congreſs of Cziſtowa.

Theſe are the objects of Mr. Pitt's *ſyſtem of peace*, and the means he takes to accompliſh them. But there muſt be a pretence for all things. Violence and injuſtice never yet were bold enough to call themſelves by their own names. MEDIATION is the word. The allied powers offer their mediation to reſtore peace.

The poliſh of diplomatique language is truly curious; but he that ſeeks to underſtand it without much previous experience

experience of what Kings at the head of armies are capable of propoſing; he that annexes the ideas received in common life to the ſame terms when uſed in the intercourſe of cabinets, will find that he has much and woefully miſtaken their meaning. Who, for inſtance, would not think that one independent ſovereign by offering his *mediation* to another, meant his *good offices* to prevent the further effuſion of human blood? No ſuch extravagance!—To mediate, according to the new ſyſtem, means to ſay, "I have urged your old enemy to attack you. Him you have beaten, and conquered many of his provinces. The war muſt have coſt you immenſe ſums, and there is no denying that by the laws of war, you have a right to indemnify yourſelves at the expence of the aggreſſor. But *it is my fancy* that you ſhould not keep one foot of thoſe conqueſts, and that you ſhould forthwith reſtore every province, town, or fortreſs you have taken ſince the beginning of the war. THIS IS MY WILL, and if you dont make peace on theſe conditions, out of my regard and friendſhip I mean to force you to it."

We have here the true ſtyle of modern *mediation!* A ſtyle to which I refer all thoſe who have hitherto imagined that there was ſome inſolence in the manifeſtos of Lewis the Fourteenth. But the ridicule—if aught in this abominable impoſition on mankind can juſtify the conſidering it in the light of ridicule, is ſtill ſtronger, when applied to our friends the Turks. They, it is well known, were earneſtly diſpoſed to conclude a peace upon the terms offered by Ruſſia. The obliging mediators, however, told them "No:—we love you ſo much, that we had rather you were all cut to pieces than conſent to it." "*I had rather ſee you hanged,*" ſays Mr. Pitt, "*than married to another.*"

All this, notwithſtanding, Mr. Pitt tells us, is *neceſſary to his ſyſtem of peace.* There can be neither ſenſe nor juſtice in a ſyſtem involving ſuch neceſſities! Say that the renovation of our treaties with Holland was a wiſe and neceſſary meaſure. I admit it. Every ſubſequent neceſſity, however, becomes more and more obſcure, and every other gradation more and more doubtful; but when by little and little we find ourſelves encompaſſed in a ſcene of troubles, and frauds, and violences, like thoſe I have been forced to

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ſtate, depend upon it we have loſt our way, and are got into a path that leads to ruin, diſgrace, and every ſpecies of national calamity.

On the treaty with Holland, Mr. Pitt engrafts a Pruſſian treaty to preſerve the firſt, and a Heſſian treaty to complete the objects of both. Next, according to his doctrine of the balance of power, ſucceeds the neceſſity of a private bye ſyſtem, under which the avowed objects of theſe treaties might be explained, amended, modified, or entirely revoked, if it ſhould ſo pleaſe him. Then comes the neceſſity of ſtirring up the Turks againſt the Ruſſians in the ſouth, of ſetting Sweden to attack her in the north, and of fomenting the troubles in the Netherlands to divert the attention of her allies; and as the laſt link in this chain of neceſſities, there follows, that we ſhould deſert, betray, and "waſh our hands" of them all, except as far as we may ſtill prevent the unhappy, duped Ottomans, from ſaving themſelves by peace, by promiſing to laviſh the laſt treaſures, and ſpill the beſt blood of our countrymen to ſupport the war.

Theſe are ſome of the leading features in this diſaſtrous buſineſs. But however juſtice may be blind, injuſtice is not always quick-ſighted. The capacity of miniſters appears upon a level with their principles.

They begin by exciting the Turks to commence hoſtilities in 1788. A Manifeſto from the Court of Vienna announces the alliance of Joſeph II. with the Czarina. He advances to the attack on the ſide of Bulgaria, but meets with a reception that ſoon reduces him to great diſtreſs. In the mean time a dangerous inſurrection in Brabant threatens him with a total loſs of thoſe Provinces; and a lingering diſeaſe of mind as well as body, bends him to the grave. To detach his ſucceſſor from the Ruſſian alliance, a Pruſſian army advances towards Bohemia; while another, aſſembled in the neighbourhood of the Netherlands threatens their ſeparation from the Auſtrian government for ever. The Britiſh Miniſter follows every where, and is the life and ſoul of all the negociations.

With ſo valuable a pledge in their hands, would any one think of ſeeing it reſtored to Leopold before he had entered into a poſitive renunciation of his engagements with Ruſſia?

That pledge, however, was given up to him; and under the

the Convention of Reichenbach he has been allowed quietly to resume the possession of his revolted Provinces, and to secure and fortify himself against any attack; preserving no less his engagements with Russia, whom he is ready to join with a full treasury, and one of the finest armies in the world.

Next comes the king of Sweden: the power of most consequence to us if we meditated an attack upon Russia in the North. Him we urged to this "work of murder," by promising to co-operate with him in case of necessity. In particular, the British Court had engaged to send a fleet to the Baltic, last summer, without which assistance, indeed, his inferiority was too decided to permit his effecting any object of the allied Courts. That Monarch tells us so himself, in his Memorial presented to the Divan in September last by his Envoy, Monsr. de Hadenstein: a document in which he states expressly, that "*his Allies had made him "many promises, but performed none;*" and in which he warns the Porte "*not to place too much confidence in them, "who in their present circumstances seek rather their own in- "terest than those of the Porte.*" The hour of trial arrives. His desperate courage, his still more desperate reliance on the British Minister's veracity, brings him into extreme danger. In vain he looks for the promised succours! his affairs grow desperate—he concludes a Peace first, and afterwards an alliance with this very power against whom we had taken so much pains to irritate him, and in whose cause he is now actually arming his whole force.

The dispute with Spain occasioned us to arm in a manner so formidable, that Mr. Dundas, a man of no delicate nerves, declared that it was enough to frighten Europe for years to come, and give us the ascendancy in all political disputes. Whether the temptation of trying its effect upon Russia induced Mr. Pit to risk this war, I cannot say; but certainly her Imperial Majesty appears as if she would yield to no ordinary terrors. Of this mighty force, which cost the nation nearly four millions, the chief part was suffered to return to the mass from whence it sprung, without our having ventured upon one representation to the Court of Petersburgh about the mischief she was doing to the Balance of Europe.

After all these instances of folly, madness, and incapacity

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in the Britiſh Miniſter, what anſwer ſhall we give him when he comes to aſk us for MONEY and CONFIDENCE? —I will briefly recapitulate his pretenſions.—

Theſe are,

That he negociates treaties for the avowed purpoſe of preſerving peace, and provokes a war before any of theſe treaties are contravened.

That he binds himſelf to a *ſyſtem* which, under the looſe phraſe of preſerving the Balance of Power, involves his country in all the broils and quarrels of the Continent.

That he deceives Parliament by concealing the exiſtence of this ſyſtem, and ſhewing them only the treaties.

That he ſtimulates the Porte to commence hoſtilities againſt Ruſſia, and now that ſhe is nearly ruined, will not let her make peace.

That he urges the King of Sweden to the ſame conduct, and deſerts him in the day of danger.

That he riſks the plunging his country into a war, in the year 1791, under a pretence that the Balance of Europe is overthrown by the capture of a Turkiſh fortreſs in the year 1788.

That within this period he ſuffered many opportunities of effecting his purpoſe, and of thereby ſaving his country from the impending miſchief, to eſcape him.

That he adviſed his Majeſty to declare from the throne, the little probability of its involving his kingdoms.

Finally, That he ſelects for the object of his attack, a power whom it has hitherto been the ſyſtem of his country to cultivate and cheriſh; whoſe growth, whether commercial or political, can be of no detriment to us; and whoſe aggrandizement in the Black Sea, or the Mediterranean, can only encroach upon the Houſe of Bourbon, Great Britain having no trade or colonies in that quarter of the world.

The plain, direct anſwer of every Engliſhman who values his country, his laws, his property, his children; or whoſe mind is enabled by education to expand itſelf into an honeſt wiſh for the general cauſe of humanity—*muſt* be, and if not this day, it *will* be ſoon—

YOU SHALL HAVE NEITHER MONEY FOR WARS, NOR CONFIDENCE FOR CORRUPT JOBS!

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

THE unpopularity of these proceedings in respect to Russia, together with some recent divisions in parliament, may save us for a time from the calamities of war; but the minister, whose incapacity and rashness would involve us in one, is reduced to a dilemma from which he has no retreat, but either in the ruin of his country, or the direct abandonment of all pretensions to public character, whether founded on political sagacity, political honesty, or political courage.

We have now the express authority of the court of Petersburg, for stating the sole point in dispute to be, whether Oczakoff and its district shall or shall not remain in the hands of the Russians?

Mr. Pitt contends for its restoration to the Turks; and says that his country shall contend for it too. The necessity of this contest he maintains by a certain combination of words and sentences, which he calls *reasons* and *arguments*. To us, who dislike their object, the value of these words and sentences is not much; but to him who maintains the *necessity* of war in this moment, undoubtedly their value must appear in a light of the utmost importance to the safety of his country.

He has declared it in parliament; he has said, that if this fortress remains with Russia, there is *an end of the Prussian power*; and by consequence, an end of our alliance with Holland. He is arming, therefore, to support the importance of Prussia.

Thus, as far as words and actions can pledge a man, Mr. Pitt is pledged to obtain *the restitution of Oczakow to the Turks, either by negociation or by force*; for, according to his own words, taken down in writing by Mr. Fox at the

the moment they were ſpoken, it comes within his meaning of THE BALANCE OF POWER that "*Turkey, as* "*the natural enemy of Ruſſia, ought to be maintained in poſ-* "*ſeſſion of every fort, paſs, or ſpot of ground from whence,* "*in the event of any future quarrel, ſhe can annoy, haraſs,* "*pillage, burn, and lay waſte the territories of that empire.*" Oczakow, therefore, coming under this deſcription, Mr. Pitt is pledged to make no peace until it be reſtored to the Turks.

So far ſo good. But now comes the difficulty. The people of this country, ſo univerſally I believe as to make the numbers in favour of this buſineſs of blood, including the biſhops, actually amount to more in the two houſes of parliament, than in the reſt of the three kingdoms beſides, execrate and abhor it ſo much as to render his perſiſting in it, IMPOSSIBLE, in the wideſt ſignification of that word. The fortifications of Cherburg are more formidable than the ruins of Oczakow, but neither of theſe places do we think worth the riſk of a war: nor will we have Ruſſia for our enemy.

In this dilemma, how is the miniſter to act? Reſponſible for the general proſperity of his country, reſponſible for all its alliances, (both of which—country and alliances —he affirms to be in ſuch imminent danger now, as to make it neceſſary for him to adviſe the king to riſk his country and his crown by going to war with half Europe) what line of conduct would a man of ſpirit purſue, if he were prevented from giving effect to the meaſures he had adviſed for their preſervation?

A MAN OF SPIRIT HAS NO CHOICE! Mr. Pitt has to chooſe between his principles, and his place.

Obſerve, that in talking of the principles and opinions of a *miniſter*, eſpecially of one whoſe opinion is law, and whoſe word is fate, (ſuch is the effect of implicit confidence given by unprincipled majorities in parliament) we talk of no trivial matter. We talk at leaſt of opinions for which, by the laws and conſtitution of his country, he is reſponſible with his head; and we collect and aſcertain thoſe opinions from the meaſures adopted by his government.

Does he retain his principles at the expence of his office? He acts a manly part, at the ſame time he does no more than

than his duty: He reſigns from no fooliſh pique; but from a conviction that he and the country thinking ſo oppoſitely of what concerns their ſafety, and the country ſo decidedly thwarting him in all his plans, he can no longer continue in their ſervice with any proſpect of benefit to them.

Does he acquieſce and give up his opinions? He may keep his place, indeed, for a few miſerable months longer, but upon terms that no honourable mind can brook—A mere puppet, without power or reſpect of any kind, who retains nothing of the ſituation of a miniſter except its emoluments and its jobs; whoſe plans for governing the country are one day the ſport of factions in the cabinet, on another, of what he deems the ſenſeleſs clamour of a deluded populace; reſponſible in the meanwhile, and puniſhable himſelf for meaſures which he thinks bad, but which he can neither direct, avert, nor influence, in any degree whatever.

Will the heaven-born miniſter ſtoop to this? Has he ſent to tell Ruſſia that, for what he cares, ſhe may retain poſſeſſion, not only of Oczakoff, but of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Beſſarabia, if ſhe chooſes? Ridiculed from one end of Europe to the other, diſappointed and deſpiſed at home, will he, when all is finiſhed, come with a haughty voice to parliament, and once more aſk for CONFIDENCE?

The duke of *Leeds*, indeed, feels his ſituation, and meets it as becomes him:—but a man diſhonoured like Mr. Pitt—what has he to do with confidence?

THE END.